“It is now clear that China has chosen to pursue state-led, mercantilist economic policies, an increasingly authoritarian governance model, and an aggressive and assertive foreign policy. The US has been compelled to reexamine and revise its strategy towards China and must ensure that the budget is properly aligned with the strategic imperative of competing with China and fighting against Beijing’s malign influence across Belt and Road countries”.
This kind of stuff, and more ranging from diplomatic strategy, military deployment, competition of values, to curbing China’s “predatory international economic behaviour” is spanning nearly 300 pages of the new Strategic Competition Act of 2021. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee already approved the legislation on Wednesday by a sweeping bipartisan vote of 21-1. The bill is now set for a vote by the full Senate.
Be honest. Well, you may not be old enough to remember, but is this the America we encountered in the 1980s and 90s and learned to love and look up to? To this day, I consider myself an Americanophile, having grown up under an umbrella of moral authority and Pax Americana. With every foreign policy action today’s Washington takes, however, my resolve weakens. To be sure, Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy may have sounded similar in nature, but The Soviet Union is hardly comparable with China.
Now mirror such belligerent tone with Xi Jinping’s diction during his keynote speech at the annual Boao Forum in Hainan, the Chinese equivalent of Davos’ World Economic Forum. “As we are going through the pandemic, people of all countries have more clearly raised that it is necessary to abandon the cold-war mentality and zero-sum game, and oppose any form of new cold war and ideological confrontation”, as was one of Xi’s key sentences.
Instead of terms like autocracy, repression, hegemony, human right violations, restrictions, sanctions, malign influence, disinformation, and predatory behaviour, Xi’s vocabulary is filled with terms such as multilateralism, mutual respect and trust, extensive consultations, great sense of responsibility, no decoupling, shared benefits, poverty alleviation, hard and soft connectivity, and BRI as a public road open to all. Whether you believe Xi’s words or not, it is no doubt the better rhetoric.
In other words, while lawmakers like Mitt Romney keep regurgitating that China is on its “march towards global hegemony of autocracy and repression” on the Senate floor, Xi is sketching architecture and the advantages of a global multilateral system to the world from Hainan, to an audience that included, among other American business leaders, Tesla’s Elon Musk, Apple’s Tim Cook, Blackstone’s Stephen Schwarzman, and Bridgewater’s Ray Dalio.
Xi’s message may not necessarily have been directed at Washington. He must have realised he can’t change the minds of the saber-rattling bunch that, instead of picking up the gauntlet and starting to outcompete China, seems to have only the containment card to play. Xi would have rather addressed the geographies and jurisdictions that matter to him, ie the entire Eurasian plate as much as the Global South that he is keen on integrating into his vision of a vast economic development and trading network.
The fact that China had been a more or less closed country and society before Henry Kissinger swung open the doors doesn’t make China a hegemon in the making just because it has started to look beyond its borders. The Beijing leadership is, as it should be, working for the advancement of its people. No one in China wants to relive the ignominious 19th-century history. But the country is so big now that it is stronger but equally fragile. Any major policy mistake could easily topple the existing equilibrium.
When you read over these new American bills and initiatives, you can’t escape the thought that Washington hasn’t grasped reality. Of course, no one would be willing to surrender a sole superpower status, and the hawkish US foreign policy community is apparently not ready to give in an inch. But at the same time, everyone needs to understand that the world is in a generational transition. China in particular is transforming and will need space and room to manoeuvre in the world.
The more belligerent Washington’s rhetoric becomes, the more Beijing will have to resort to alternative strategic choices, from grooming trading partners in its own ecosystem to militarily securing maritime trade routes, as it has been made clear there will no longer be a reliable accord around the Indo-Pacific. This will almost certainly build up tensions further and not contribute to de-escalation. The big question is whether the rest of the world will side with America by a majority and isolate China.
Massive efforts are being made. The US bill includes a 655 million budget provision to make perceived allies accomplices. For example, Belt and Road countries will be targeted to promote transparency and undo Beijing’s alleged disinformation campaigns. Instead, Asian media will be sponsored to be critical of China and disperse American propaganda. A link-up with American digital and cybersecurity infrastructure is to be proposed to such allies, highly conducive to expand US intelligence in the region.
In addition, Asian countries will be offered surplus American defence equipment at reduced prices – Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam are being mentioned. Sadly, even educational and research institutions working with China are meant to be scrutinised, and one amendment to the bill indicates a diplomatic boycott of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics. Admittedly, this piece of legislation looks comprehensive.
But do we really think that all those so-called stakeholders will be playing their part? China doesn’t even need to become a hegemon in the region. Its ever-larger economic sphere of influence reaches across much of South-East Asia and the Global South. Why would European nations forego the largest consumer market in the world, as long as multilateral principles guide the relationship? And how much corporate lobbying will there be, once it transpires what is at stake regarding US business interests?
China may not be the partner of choice, but opportunistic governments around ASEAN and elsewhere will ultimately follow the money. Sure, if they can procure a few US warships on the cheap, they will go for it. But most are likely to be comfortable with China just because of their own sizeable Chinese diasporas and Confucianism as a basis for China’s proclaimed peaceful rise. And they have not forgotten what China has achieved in the past 25 years. It’s a track record matched by no one and least of all by America.
