Cui Tiankai, the Chinese ambassador in Washington, may have hit the point home in a recent webinar that this space extensively commented on in Monday’s post. At the end of a debate with American counterparts he questioned the drive to make US policy against China more efficient if it was the wrong policy to begin with, and he indicated that US relations with some allies could not go back to the past much like US-Chinese relations couldn’t.
To be sure, a sole superpower as America still has little time for the concept of a multipolar world. But that cannot hide the fact that the globe is moving in that very direction, inexorably loosening up tried-and-tested alliances of the past. As much as Washington is trying to paper over the cracks of the pandemic and the hard impact it took on the country, the undeniable domestic US crisis is welcome news for everyone who wants to steer away from the American headlock.
Europeans are very pleased with Joe Biden’s election win, or so they say. But is everything so truly positive and friendly, or is it sheer signs of opportunism that the public gets to witness? Take Germany, for example, the allied country that had the bear the biggest brunt of Donald Trump’s bullying nature, from the US envoy Richard Grenell who directly threatened German enterprises and their managements with sanctions to Trump’s insulting behaviour toward Angela Merkel.
Berlin has been on the hook for two particular reasons. Washington wants to prevent Germany from adopting Huawei equipment in its 5G buildout, and it has been demanding that the advanced construction of gas pipeline Nordstream2 with Russia be terminated. But what do you know…? Biden or not, the German government found the courage to push back. In an almost stealthy mode, Nordstream recently got the nod to be completed, and laws are being passed not to exclude Huawei.
By doing this, Germany may not have acted in line with a grand European strategy that still prioritises saying what Washington wants to hear, but the Berlin leadership has finally come to the conclusion that making independent choices for a German economic policy is existential. Energy security is not just important for the entire continent but particularly so for Germany that has responsibly abstained from nuclear and coal power plants. As is 5G and the future of German industrial competitiveness.
Of course, Berlin will always subscribe to the trans-Atlantic partnership, but not at any price as it transpires. Berlin, it seems, is no longer willing to dance to every Washington tune. A new partnership will have to be a give-and-take going forward, else it is deemed no partnership worthy of honouring. That, by the way, will also apply to relations with China. Berlin with its export-led economic model simply cannot afford to miss out of the soon-to-be biggest consumer market in the world.
Another example blatantly staring in people’s faces is Turkey. At a virtual meeting of NATO foreign ministers in November it came to quite some commotion between Mike Pompeo and his Turkish counterpart Mevlut Cavusoglu. Pompeo’s criticism of Turkey’s role in the spat with Greece surrounding maritime territories and breaching a UN arms embargo on Libya, as well as Ankara’s support of Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, was just met with a cold shoulder.
Washington is clearly getting impatient with a NATO member that has for a while now presented traits of strategic autonomy and multipolar opportunism. Turkey’s foreign policy under president Recep Erdogan has become nationalistically independent and also more frequently interferes with America’s Middle Eastern policies. The cherry on the cake must have been Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missile system that was literally rubbed into the Western alliance’s face.
Such opportunism has also always been practiced by most of the ASEAN nations, particularly since Trump terminated America’s engagement in TPP. Meanwhile, RCEP has taken over and Beijing catapulted itself into the driving seat on trade in the region. Any potential initiatives from the Biden administration to revive Washington’s role in the modified version CPTPP may well be too little, too late. In any case, it will be the US playing catch-up.
India is now more or less a US ally participating in the QUAD, but we will have to see how long Delhi is able to maintain that course. Too many their traditional relations with countries like America’s arch-foe Iran, that have flourished under the decade-long non-alignment policy, are at stake, and it can hardly be in the eye of the beholder that India is in danger of being replaced by China as the main economic and trading partner.
Japan, South Korea, and Australia maintain unbreakable geopolitical ties with America, but either will have to rethink their die-hard US allegiance. They have economically become inseparable from China, increasingly so, which must have an influence on their respective foreign policies. Seoul has visibly abstained from being lured into QUAD. Tokyo’s new prime minister Suga is in favour of a more constructive dialogue with Beijing. And Scott Morrison recently bit his lip and back-paddled from his previously hawkish rhetoric.
Even the century-old, previously untouchable Monroe Doctrine that is to tie Latin America to Washington’s fold and supervision is at risk these days. Venezuela’s parliamentary election last Sunday has cemented Nicholas Madura’s reign and opened the country further to economic and other assistance from China and Russia. More nations on the continent have sought refuge in deepening relations away from Washington and building out trade with Asia and especially China.
So, when America speaks of its allies and the need to protect them, we are naturally and warmly reminded of the Pax Americana we all grew up under during the Cold War. And we should be eternally grateful for the stability in the world that was provided then. But what does it actually mean today…? Is it a form of protectorate designed to make partners amenable for America’s very own interests? It appears Washington is trying hard, but the post-War narrative just doesn’t work so well anymore.
